Trato diferenciado por tipo en mercados de asignación unilaterales

We introduce in the one-sided assignment game by Shapley and Scarf (1974) the requirement called “Treating equals equally and unequal unequally” (TEEUU). We model an assignment as a measurable function that assigns a type of good to each type of agent. We establish: 1) a method, originated in optima...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores principales: Cantala, David, Mendoza-Palacios, Saul
Formato: Online
Idioma:inglês
espanhol
Editor: El Colegio de México, A.C. 2025
Assuntos:
Acesso em linha:https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/461
Recursos:

Estudios Económicos