Un enfoque de diseño de mercados para la selección de personal del Instituto Nacional Electoral en México
In this document we propose a model based in matching games to analyze the problem of workers’ selection by the National Electoral Institute of Mexico. After a revision of the theoretically relevant results, an allocation mechanism is proposed to select the workers. This mechanism improves the exist...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Online |
| Idioma: | espanhol |
| Editor: |
El Colegio de México, A.C.
2015
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| Assuntos: | |
| Acesso em linha: | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/23 |
| Recursos: |
Estudios Económicos |
| Resumo: | In this document we propose a model based in matching games to analyze the problem of workers’ selection by the National Electoral Institute of Mexico. After a revision of the theoretically relevant results, an allocation mechanism is proposed to select the workers. This mechanism improves the existing procedure. |
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