Protección arancelaria y acuerdos comerciales
This paper studies the optimal tariff rates on goods imported from the rest of the world when a commercial club accepts a new partner. It shows that when a new member is accepted into the club, the other members of a free trade agreement have incentives to reduce tariffs on the rest of the world...
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| Formato: | Online |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| Editor: |
El Colegio de México, A.C.
1999
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| Acceso en línea: | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/224 |
| Revista: |
Estudios Económicos |
| Sumario: | This paper studies the optimal tariff rates on goods imported from the rest of the world when a commercial club accepts a new partner. It shows that when a new member is accepted into the club, the other members of a free trade agreement have incentives to reduce tariffs on the rest of the world's goods. However, when the trade agreement is a custom union, the union may have incentives to increase the common external tariff. This happens when the industry of the custom union is small compared to the world industry. |
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