¿Amigos por siempre? Rupturas en el PRI y su efecto en el gasto social durante el autoritarismo electoral en México (1988-2000)
Partisan defections in electoral authoritarianism have been shown to generate instability for the regime. The reaction of autocrats has also been analyzed. It may be expected that they begin by repressing the “traitors.” However, I argue that there is a less risky strategy to resolve the threat of p...
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| Format: | Online |
| Langue: | espagnol |
| Éditeur: |
El Colegio de México A.C.
2022
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| Accès en ligne: | https://forointernacional.colmex.mx/index.php/fi/article/view/2884 |
| Institution: |
Foro Internacional |
| Résumé: | Partisan defections in electoral authoritarianism have been shown to generate instability for the regime. The reaction of autocrats has also been analyzed. It may be expected that they begin by repressing the “traitors.” However, I argue that there is a less risky strategy to resolve the threat of party ruptures. I hold that autocrats can appeal to the masses through increases in social spending and thereby avoid them being coopted by the defectors. I examine this argument using models for panel data and evidence from the authoritarian period in Mexico at state level. |
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