Trato diferenciado por tipo en mercados de asignación unilaterales

We introduce in the one-sided assignment game by Shapley and Scarf (1974) the requirement called “Treating equals equally and unequal unequally” (TEEUU). We model an assignment as a measurable function that assigns a type of good to each type of agent. We establish: 1) a method, originated in optima...

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書目詳細資料
主要作者: Cantala, David, Mendoza-Palacios, Saul
格式: Online
語言:英语
西班牙语
出版: El Colegio de México, A.C. 2025
主題:
在線閱讀:https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/461
機構:

Estudios Económicos