Trato diferenciado por tipo en mercados de asignación unilaterales
We introduce in the one-sided assignment game by Shapley and Scarf (1974) the requirement called “Treating equals equally and unequal unequally” (TEEUU). We model an assignment as a measurable function that assigns a type of good to each type of agent. We establish: 1) a method, originated in optima...
| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Online |
| Langue: | anglais espagnol |
| Éditeur: |
El Colegio de México, A.C.
2025
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| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/461 |
| Institution: |
Estudios Económicos |