Trato diferenciado por tipo en mercados de asignación unilaterales

We introduce in the one-sided assignment game by Shapley and Scarf (1974) the requirement called “Treating equals equally and unequal unequally” (TEEUU). We model an assignment as a measurable function that assigns a type of good to each type of agent. We establish: 1) a method, originated in optima...

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Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Cantala, David, Mendoza-Palacios, Saul
Format:	Online
Language:	English Spanish
Editor:	El Colegio de México, A.C. 2025
Subjects:	core Pareto optimality optimal transportation theory one-sided matching D79 D51 C78 C62 C61 optimalidad de Pareto teoría del transporte óptimo emparejamiento unilateral
Online Access:	https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/461
Journal:	Estudios Económicos