Trato diferenciado por tipo en mercados de asignación unilaterales
We introduce in the one-sided assignment game by Shapley and Scarf (1974) the requirement called “Treating equals equally and unequal unequally” (TEEUU). We model an assignment as a measurable function that assigns a type of good to each type of agent. We establish: 1) a method, originated in optima...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Online |
| Idioma: | inglés español |
| Editor: |
El Colegio de México, A.C.
2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/461 |
| Revista: |
Estudios Económicos |
| Sumario: | We introduce in the one-sided assignment game by Shapley and Scarf (1974) the requirement called “Treating equals equally and unequal unequally” (TEEUU). We model an assignment as a measurable function that assigns a type of good to each type of agent. We establish: 1) a method, originated in optimal transportation theory, to find a TEEUU assignment in the core whenever it exists- by searching a Pareto optimal assignment- and 2) conditions under which a TEEUU assignment in the core always exists. |
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