Regulación a través de precios de referencia
We analyze the role of reference prices on competition and welfare in a circular city model where paying prices above a reference negatively affects consumers' utility. Agents interact in a three-stage game. First, a policymaker chooses a reference price; second, firms make their entry decision...
| 主要作者: | |
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| 格式: | Online |
| 語言: | 英语 |
| 出版: |
El Colegio de México, A.C.
2024
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/450 |
| 機構: |
Estudios Económicos |
| 總結: | We analyze the role of reference prices on competition and welfare in a circular city model where paying prices above a reference negatively affects consumers' utility. Agents interact in a three-stage game. First, a policymaker chooses a reference price; second, firms make their entry decision; finally, firms compete in prices while consumers make their consumption decisions. We find that the market price and the optimal reference price always coincide in equilibrium, reducing consumer prices and implying a net welfare gain. |
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