Un procedimiento elemental de transferencias para repartir el excedente conjunto en juegos con externalidades

Sánchez-Pérez (2017, Theorem 3) presents an analytic characterization for all solutions for games with externalities that satisfy the axioms of linearity, symmetry, and efficiency. The main goal of this paper is to recast such formulation to a more intuitive interpretation. In particular, we are int...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal: Sánchez-Pérez, Joss Erick
Formato: Online
Idioma:inglês
Editor: El Colegio de México, A.C. 2023
Assuntos:
Acesso em linha:https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/445
Recursos:

Estudios Económicos

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