Un procedimiento elemental de transferencias para repartir el excedente conjunto en juegos con externalidades

Sánchez-Pérez (2017, Theorem 3) presents an analytic characterization for all solutions for games with externalities that satisfy the axioms of linearity, symmetry, and efficiency. The main goal of this paper is to recast such formulation to a more intuitive interpretation. In particular, we are int...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Sánchez-Pérez, Joss Erick
Format: Online
Langue:anglais
Éditeur: El Colegio de México, A.C. 2023
Sujets:
Accès en ligne:https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/445
Institution:

Estudios Económicos

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