Dinámica de precios en un modelo de reputación de dos períodos
This paper looks at the time-path of prices in a two-period modified version of the reputation model of Milgrom and Roberts(10) in which a non-standard price signalling stage game is substituted for the entry-deterrence game those authors work with. It shows that prices may rise or fall from one per...
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| Formato: | Online |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| Editor: |
El Colegio de México, A.C.
2001
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| Acceso en línea: | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/205 |
| Revista: |
Estudios Económicos |
| Sumario: | This paper looks at the time-path of prices in a two-period modified version of the reputation model of Milgrom and Roberts(10) in which a non-standard price signalling stage game is substituted for the entry-deterrence game those authors work with. It shows that prices may rise or fall from one period to the next. Also, it shows that ‘bonding’ is not possible in this environment. |
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