Comportamiento del equilibrio en una subasta todos-pagan con información completa
A widely used sealed-bid auction is the first-price auction. In this auction, the highest bidder wins the item and pays the price submitted; the other bidders get and pay nothing. The all-pay auction is similar to the first-price auction, except that losers must also pay their submitted bids. The Na...
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| 格式: | Online |
| 語言: | 英语 |
| 出版: |
El Colegio de México, A.C.
2004
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/177 |
| 機構: |
Estudios Económicos |
| authentication_code | dc |
|---|---|
| _version_ | 1844256675523985408 |
| author | López Acevedo, Gladys |
| author_facet | López Acevedo, Gladys |
| author_sort | López Acevedo, Gladys |
| category_str_mv |
"Bolivia", "hyperinflation", "economic crisis", "Bolivia", "hiperinflación", "crisis económica"
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| collection | OJS |
| description | A widely used sealed-bid auction is the first-price auction. In this auction, the highest bidder wins the item and pays the price submitted; the other bidders get and pay nothing. The all-pay auction is similar to the first-price auction, except that losers must also pay their submitted bids. The Nash equilibria of this game involve the use of randomized strategies, which protect bidders from being overbid by a small amount. This paper generalizes the standard Nash equilibrium analysis of the all-pay auction to allow for endogenously determined decision "errors". Such errors may either be due to mistakes or to unobserved random variation in payoff functions. The error distributions depend on equilibrium expected payoffs, which in turn determine the error distributions as a fixed point. A striking result derived in this paper is that for any structure of the error terms the generalized Nash equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium of the all-pay auction are equivalent if the error terms are identically and independently distributed. |
| format | Online |
| id | oai:oai.estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx:article-177 |
| index_str_mv | CONAHCYT LATINDEX PKP Index DORA Redalyc Scielo México Handbook of Latin American Studies (HLAS) JSTOR Dialnet HAPI Ulrich’s International Periodicals Directory Google Scholar IBSS Gale OneFile: Informe Académico Global Issues in Context InfoTracCustom Cengage Learning EconLit Índice bibliográfico Publindex RePEc The Journal of Economic Literature |
| journal | Estudios Económicos |
| language | eng |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| publisher | El Colegio de México, A.C. |
| record_format | ojs |
| Terms_governing_use_and_reproduction_note | Copyright (c) 2018 Estudios Económicos |
| data_source_entry/ISSN | Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México; 37-vol. 19, no. 1, january-june, 2004; 93-124 Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México; 37-vol. 19, núm. 1, enero-junio, 2004; 93-124 0186-7202 0188-6916 |
| spelling | oai:oai.estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx:article-1772023-02-20T23:40:35Z Equilibrium behavior in all-pay auction with complete information Comportamiento del equilibrio en una subasta todos-pagan con información completa López Acevedo, Gladys Nash equilibria all-pay auction C72 C91 equilibrios de Nash subasta todos-pagan C72 C91 A widely used sealed-bid auction is the first-price auction. In this auction, the highest bidder wins the item and pays the price submitted; the other bidders get and pay nothing. The all-pay auction is similar to the first-price auction, except that losers must also pay their submitted bids. The Nash equilibria of this game involve the use of randomized strategies, which protect bidders from being overbid by a small amount. This paper generalizes the standard Nash equilibrium analysis of the all-pay auction to allow for endogenously determined decision "errors". Such errors may either be due to mistakes or to unobserved random variation in payoff functions. The error distributions depend on equilibrium expected payoffs, which in turn determine the error distributions as a fixed point. A striking result derived in this paper is that for any structure of the error terms the generalized Nash equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium of the all-pay auction are equivalent if the error terms are identically and independently distributed. En una subasta todos-pagan, los licitantes pagan el precio ofrecido y el licitante que somete la oferta más alta gana el bien. Los equilibrios de Nash de este juego incluyen el uso de estrategias aleatorias, que protegen a los licitantes de perder por una pequeña cantidad. Este documento generaliza el análisis ordinario para permitir “errores" de decisión endógenos, que pueden ser debido a equivocaciones o a variaciones aleatorias no observadas en las funciones de pago. La distribución de los errores depende de los pagos esperados en equilibrio, que a su vez determinan las distribuciones de errores como un punto fijo. Un resultado derivado de este trabajo es que el equilibrio generalizado de Nash y el equilibrio Nash de la subasta todos-pagan son equivalentes si los términos de error son idéntica e independientemente distribuidos. El Colegio de México, A.C. 2004-01-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/177 10.24201/ee.v19i1.177 Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México; 37-vol. 19, no. 1, january-june, 2004; 93-124 Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México; 37-vol. 19, núm. 1, enero-junio, 2004; 93-124 0186-7202 0188-6916 eng https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/177/179 Copyright (c) 2018 Estudios Económicos |
| spellingShingle | Nash equilibria all-pay auction C72 C91 equilibrios de Nash subasta todos-pagan C72 C91 López Acevedo, Gladys Comportamiento del equilibrio en una subasta todos-pagan con información completa |
| title | Comportamiento del equilibrio en una subasta todos-pagan con información completa |
| title_alt | Equilibrium behavior in all-pay auction with complete information |
| title_full | Comportamiento del equilibrio en una subasta todos-pagan con información completa |
| title_fullStr | Comportamiento del equilibrio en una subasta todos-pagan con información completa |
| title_full_unstemmed | Comportamiento del equilibrio en una subasta todos-pagan con información completa |
| title_short | Comportamiento del equilibrio en una subasta todos-pagan con información completa |
| title_sort | comportamiento del equilibrio en una subasta todos pagan con informacion completa |
| topic | Nash equilibria all-pay auction C72 C91 equilibrios de Nash subasta todos-pagan C72 C91 |
| topic_facet | Nash equilibria all-pay auction C72 C91 equilibrios de Nash subasta todos-pagan C72 C91 |
| url | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/177 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lopezacevedogladys equilibriumbehaviorinallpayauctionwithcompleteinformation AT lopezacevedogladys comportamientodelequilibrioenunasubastatodospaganconinformacioncompleta |