Recaudador vs. contribuyente: el juego de la evasión fiscal

This paper incorporates the strategic interactions between tax payers and fiscal authorities to the standard theory of fiscal evasion. The existence and (local) unicity of Nash equilibrium are demonstrated by the players’ best responses. Through a numerical analysis, it is concluded that “greater sa...

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Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Lara Pulido, José Alberto
Format:	Online
Language:	Spanish
Editor:	El Colegio de México, A.C. 2007
Subjects:	corrupción comportamiento de los agentes económicos políticas fiscales teoría del juego evasión fiscal H30 D73 H26 C72 corruption behaviour of economic agents fiscal policies game theory tax evasion
Online Access:	https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/142
Journal:	Estudios Económicos