Votar en elecciones federales por bienes públicos locales en una economía fiscalmente centralizada
In this paper we develop a probabilistic voting model of inter-governmental transfers to explain the distribution and size of local public goods. We find that: i) The parties political competition for votes induces the central government to provide regional transfers that lead to Pareto efficient lo...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Online |
| Language: | English |
| Editor: |
El Colegio de México, A.C.
2011
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/102 |
| Journal: |
Estudios Económicos |
| Summary: | In this paper we develop a probabilistic voting model of inter-governmental transfers to explain the distribution and size of local public goods. We find that: i) The parties political competition for votes induces the central government to provide regional transfers that lead to Pareto efficient local public goods with and without inter-regional spillovers. ii) The central government has political incentives to produce differentiated and uniform local public goods. Moreover, we provide a comparative analysis to study the influence of political competition, the extent of inter-regional spillovers of local public goods, and the distribution of the population in the economy on the size and distribution of local public spending. |
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