| Sumario: | The Russian Federation uses two tools to facilitate and extend its influence in the Slavic post-Soviet sphere: the “Russian World,” and its twin idea “Slavic brotherhood.” The first tool is expressed in two ways: first, protection of Russian minorities in an area that Russia considers its sphere of influence (Transnistria in Moldova, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, or Crimea and Donbas in Ukraine). Second, Russia denies the national character of certain states, such as Belarus and Ukraine. Instead, both are defined as Russians, or ways of being Russian. In either case, the consequence is that Russia reserves its right to (military) intervention to protect the Russian minorities.
Regarding the second tool, Slavic brotherhood, this construct is applied to other peoples who are not considered by the Kremlin to be Russians, but fellow Slavs. This is the case of Serbia, dealt with in this paper. Perpetuating the myth of “Slavic Brotherhood” allows Russia—particularly since the Kosovan war—to increases its influence in large sectors of Serbian public opinion.
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