El “pragmatismo principista” de la política exterior de México en los votos sobre Cuba en la OEA (1962-1964)
The central aim of this paper is to explain the reasons why the government of Adolfo López Mateos (alm) produced three different votes at three different meetings of the Organization of American States (oas), over a relatively brief period, on issues relating to Cuba and the anti-communist policy of...
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| Format: | Online |
| Language: | Spanish |
| Editor: |
El Colegio de México A.C.
2021
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://forointernacional.colmex.mx/index.php/fi/article/view/2850 |
| Journal: |
Foro Internacional |
| authentication_code | dc |
|---|---|
| _version_ | 1853489678859108352 |
| author | Velázquez Flores, Rafael |
| author_facet | Velázquez Flores, Rafael |
| author_sort | Velázquez Flores, Rafael |
| category_str_mv |
"Bolivia", "hyperinflation", "economic crisis", "Bolivia", "hiperinflación", "crisis económica"
|
| collection | OJS |
| description | The central aim of this paper is to explain the reasons why the government of Adolfo López Mateos (alm) produced three different votes at three different meetings of the Organization of American States (oas), over a relatively brief period, on issues relating to Cuba and the anti-communist policy of the United States. To do this it analyzes the concept of the win-sets of Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory, the decision-making process of Mexico’s foreign policy towards Cuba in the context of these three meetings. The different votes are explained on the basis of the size of the win-sets in each case, which were determined on the basis of different internal and external circumstances that are presented in each moment. The decision depended principally on the interest of the government and the impact of the pressure groups, both internal and external, that had an interest in the issue at the time and in the prevailing domestic and international situation.
The essay seeks to demonstrate the following hypothesis. In Mexican public opinion, there is a widespread view that the government of alm supported Cuba at these meetings of the oas. However, the aim here is to show that in fact, Mexico was aligned with the interests of the United States and not with those of the Castro regime. |
| format | Online |
| id | oai:oai.forointernacional.colmex.mx:article-2850 |
| index_str_mv | CONAHCYT LATINDEX PKP Index DOAJ DORA Redalyc Scielo México CLASE Handbook of Latin American Studies (HLAS) JSTOR Dialnet Sociological Abstracts HAPI HELA CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstracts Historical Abstracts IBSS America History and Life Historical Abstracts. Part B. Twentieth Century Abstracts Index Islamicus PAIS International International Political Science Abstract OCLC First Search |
| journal | Foro Internacional |
| language | spa |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | El Colegio de México A.C. |
| record_format | ojs |
| Terms_governing_use_and_reproduction_note | Derechos de autor 2021 Foro Internacional |
| data_source_entry/ISSN | Foro Internacional; Vol. LXI, 3 (245) july - september, 2021; 687-768 Foro Internacional; Vol. LXI, 3 (245) julio - septiembre, 2021; 687-768 2448-6523 0185-013X |
| spelling | oai:oai.forointernacional.colmex.mx:article-28502025-07-10T19:22:34Z The “principled pragmatism” of Mexican foreign policy in the votes on Cuba at the OEA (1962-1964) El “pragmatismo principista” de la política exterior de México en los votos sobre Cuba en la OEA (1962-1964) Velázquez Flores, Rafael pragmatismo principista proceso de toma de decisiones política exterior México Cuba Estados Unidos juego del doble nivel teoría de los win-sets Organización de los Estados Americanos OEA principled pragmatism decision-making process foreign policy Mexico; Cuba United States two-level game theory of win-sets Organization of American States OEA The central aim of this paper is to explain the reasons why the government of Adolfo López Mateos (alm) produced three different votes at three different meetings of the Organization of American States (oas), over a relatively brief period, on issues relating to Cuba and the anti-communist policy of the United States. To do this it analyzes the concept of the win-sets of Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory, the decision-making process of Mexico’s foreign policy towards Cuba in the context of these three meetings. The different votes are explained on the basis of the size of the win-sets in each case, which were determined on the basis of different internal and external circumstances that are presented in each moment. The decision depended principally on the interest of the government and the impact of the pressure groups, both internal and external, that had an interest in the issue at the time and in the prevailing domestic and international situation. The essay seeks to demonstrate the following hypothesis. In Mexican public opinion, there is a widespread view that the government of alm supported Cuba at these meetings of the oas. However, the aim here is to show that in fact, Mexico was aligned with the interests of the United States and not with those of the Castro regime. El objetivo central de este artículo es explicar las razones por las cuales el gobierno de Adolfo López Mateos (alm) emitió tres votos diferentes en tres reuniones distintas de la Organización de los Estados Americanos (oea), en un tiempo relativamente corto, sobre temas vinculados a Cuba y la política anticomunista de Estados Unidos. Para ello, el trabajo analiza, a partir de la noción de los win-sets (conjuntos ganadores) de la teoría del juego del doble nivel de Robert Putnam, el proceso de toma de decisiones de la política exterior de México frente a Cuba en el marco de esas tres reuniones. Los votos diferenciados se explican en función del tamaño de los win-sets en cada caso, los cuales estaban determinados a partir de distintas coyunturas internas y externas que se presentaron en cada momento. La decisión dependía, principalmente, del interés del gobierno y del peso de los grupos de presión, tanto internos como externos, que en ese momento tenían interés en el tema y de la situación nacional e internacional que en ese entonces prevalecía. El ensayo busca demostrar la siguiente hipótesis. En la opinión pública mexicana, existe una interpretación generalizada de que el gobierno de alm apoyó a Cuba en esas reuniones de la oea. Sin embargo, aquí se busca probar que, en los hechos, México se alineó a los intereses de Estados Unidos y no a los del régimen de Castro. El Colegio de México A.C. 2021-06-29 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/xml https://forointernacional.colmex.mx/index.php/fi/article/view/2850 10.24201/fi.v61i3.2850 Foro Internacional; Vol. LXI, 3 (245) july - september, 2021; 687-768 Foro Internacional; Vol. LXI, 3 (245) julio - septiembre, 2021; 687-768 2448-6523 0185-013X spa https://forointernacional.colmex.mx/index.php/fi/article/view/2850/2790 https://forointernacional.colmex.mx/index.php/fi/article/view/2850/2806 Derechos de autor 2021 Foro Internacional |
| spellingShingle | pragmatismo principista proceso de toma de decisiones política exterior México Cuba Estados Unidos juego del doble nivel teoría de los win-sets Organización de los Estados Americanos OEA principled pragmatism decision-making process foreign policy Mexico; Cuba United States two-level game theory of win-sets Organization of American States OEA Velázquez Flores, Rafael El “pragmatismo principista” de la política exterior de México en los votos sobre Cuba en la OEA (1962-1964) |
| title | El “pragmatismo principista” de la política exterior de México en los votos sobre Cuba en la OEA (1962-1964) |
| title_alt | The “principled pragmatism” of Mexican foreign policy in the votes on Cuba at the OEA (1962-1964) |
| title_full | El “pragmatismo principista” de la política exterior de México en los votos sobre Cuba en la OEA (1962-1964) |
| title_fullStr | El “pragmatismo principista” de la política exterior de México en los votos sobre Cuba en la OEA (1962-1964) |
| title_full_unstemmed | El “pragmatismo principista” de la política exterior de México en los votos sobre Cuba en la OEA (1962-1964) |
| title_short | El “pragmatismo principista” de la política exterior de México en los votos sobre Cuba en la OEA (1962-1964) |
| title_sort | el pragmatismo principista de la politica exterior de mexico en los votos sobre cuba en la oea 1962 1964 |
| topic | pragmatismo principista proceso de toma de decisiones política exterior México Cuba Estados Unidos juego del doble nivel teoría de los win-sets Organización de los Estados Americanos OEA principled pragmatism decision-making process foreign policy Mexico; Cuba United States two-level game theory of win-sets Organization of American States OEA |
| topic_facet | pragmatismo principista proceso de toma de decisiones política exterior México Cuba Estados Unidos juego del doble nivel teoría de los win-sets Organización de los Estados Americanos OEA principled pragmatism decision-making process foreign policy Mexico; Cuba United States two-level game theory of win-sets Organization of American States OEA |
| url | https://forointernacional.colmex.mx/index.php/fi/article/view/2850 |
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