Una nota sobre amenazas y promesas justas

With their Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium (SRE), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) developed a solution concept that incorporates reciprocity in sequential games. A SRE evaluates the kindness or unkindness of a strategy based purely on the actions it prescribes at the equilibrium path. However,...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Moreno-Okuno, Alejandro Tatsuo
Formato: Online
Idioma:inglés
Editor: El Colegio de México, A.C. 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/429
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Estudios Económicos

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author Moreno-Okuno, Alejandro Tatsuo
author_facet Moreno-Okuno, Alejandro Tatsuo
author_sort Moreno-Okuno, Alejandro Tatsuo
category_str_mv "Bolivia", "hyperinflation", "economic crisis", "Bolivia", "hiperinflación", "crisis económica"
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description With their Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium (SRE), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) developed a solution concept that incorporates reciprocity in sequential games. A SRE evaluates the kindness or unkindness of a strategy based purely on the actions it prescribes at the equilibrium path. However, given that it is not the objective of the SRE to evaluate threats and promises, it does not consider the actions outside the equilibrium path, where threats and promises are included. This article develops a new solution concept, Fair Threat Equilibria, which main objective is to give more reasonable predictions when threats and promises are included.
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Terms_governing_use_and_reproduction_note Copyright (c) 2022 Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México
data_source_entry/ISSN Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México; 73-vol. 37, no. 1, january-june, 2022; 171-198
Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México; 73-vol. 37, núm. 1, enero-junio, 2022; 171-198
0186-7202
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spelling oai:oai.estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx:article-4292023-11-22T13:40:35Z A note on fair threats and promises Una nota sobre amenazas y promesas justas Moreno-Okuno, Alejandro Tatsuo Reciprocity Promises Threats A13 C70 D63 Reciprocity Promises Threats A13 C70 D63 With their Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium (SRE), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) developed a solution concept that incorporates reciprocity in sequential games. A SRE evaluates the kindness or unkindness of a strategy based purely on the actions it prescribes at the equilibrium path. However, given that it is not the objective of the SRE to evaluate threats and promises, it does not consider the actions outside the equilibrium path, where threats and promises are included. This article develops a new solution concept, Fair Threat Equilibria, which main objective is to give more reasonable predictions when threats and promises are included. Con su Equilibrio de Reciprocidad Secuencial (SRE, por sus siglas en inglés), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) desarrollaron un concepto de solución que incorpora la reciprocidad en juegos secuenciales. Un SRE evalúa la bondad o la falta de bondad de una estrategia solamente en las acciones que prescribe la estrategia en el sendero del equilibrio. Sin embargo, el SRE no toma en cuenta las acciones afuera del sendero del equilibrio, donde están incluidas las amenazas y promesas. Este artículo desarrolla un nuevo concepto de solución, Equilibrio de Amenazas Justas, cuyo principal objetivo es dar predicciones más razonables cuando amenazas y promesas son incluidas. El Colegio de México, A.C. 2022-02-10 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf text/xml https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/429 10.24201/ee.v37i1.429 Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México; 73-vol. 37, no. 1, january-june, 2022; 171-198 Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México; 73-vol. 37, núm. 1, enero-junio, 2022; 171-198 0186-7202 0188-6916 eng https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/429/565 https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/429/577 Copyright (c) 2022 Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México
spellingShingle Reciprocity
Promises
Threats
A13
C70
D63
Reciprocity
Promises
Threats
A13
C70
D63
Moreno-Okuno, Alejandro Tatsuo
Una nota sobre amenazas y promesas justas
title Una nota sobre amenazas y promesas justas
title_alt A note on fair threats and promises
title_full Una nota sobre amenazas y promesas justas
title_fullStr Una nota sobre amenazas y promesas justas
title_full_unstemmed Una nota sobre amenazas y promesas justas
title_short Una nota sobre amenazas y promesas justas
title_sort una nota sobre amenazas y promesas justas
topic Reciprocity
Promises
Threats
A13
C70
D63
Reciprocity
Promises
Threats
A13
C70
D63
topic_facet Reciprocity
Promises
Threats
A13
C70
D63
Reciprocity
Promises
Threats
A13
C70
D63
url https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/429
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