Un enfoque de diseño de mercados para la selección de personal del Instituto Nacional Electoral en México
In this document we propose a model based in matching games to analyze the problem of workers’ selection by the National Electoral Institute of Mexico. After a revision of the theoretically relevant results, an allocation mechanism is proposed to select the workers. This mechanism improves the exist...
| 主要作者: | , |
|---|---|
| 格式: | Online |
| 語言: | 西班牙语 |
| 出版: |
El Colegio de México, A.C.
2015
|
| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/23 |
| 機構: |
Estudios Económicos |
| 總結: | In this document we propose a model based in matching games to analyze the problem of workers’ selection by the National Electoral Institute of Mexico. After a revision of the theoretically relevant results, an allocation mechanism is proposed to select the workers. This mechanism improves the existing procedure. |
|---|