Cumplimiento en pago de contribuciones: autoridades fiscales versus religiosas en México

This paper studies fiscal correspondence and fiscal trust. Through an experimental design carried out in Oaxaca, Mexico it explores which authority, the religious or the civil one, is better at collecting contributions to finance common goods. Results suggest that fiscal correspondence is the main f...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Chávez Maza, Luis Augusto, Elbittar, Alexander, Hernández Trillo, Fausto
Format: Online
Language:Spanish
Editor: El Colegio de México, A.C. 2015
Subjects:
Online Access:https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/22
Journal:

Estudios Económicos

Description
Summary:This paper studies fiscal correspondence and fiscal trust. Through an experimental design carried out in Oaxaca, Mexico it explores which authority, the religious or the civil one, is better at collecting contributions to finance common goods. Results suggest that fiscal correspondence is the main factor to explain better collection. That is, when the good is observable, people are more willing to pay the contribution.