Votar en elecciones federales por bienes públicos locales en una economía fiscalmente centralizada

In this paper we develop a probabilistic voting model of inter-governmental transfers to explain the distribution and size of local public goods. We find that: i) The parties political competition for votes induces the central government to provide regional transfers that lead to Pareto efficient lo...

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Auteurs principaux:	Kochi, Ikuho, Ponce Rodríguez, Raúl . A
Format:	Online
Langue:	anglais
Éditeur:	El Colegio de México, A.C. 2011
Sujets:	competencia electoral tamaño del gobierno transferencias inter-gubernamentales H50 H41 H77 electoral competition size of government inter-governmental transfers
Accès en ligne:	https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/102
Institution:	Estudios Económicos