Votar en elecciones federales por bienes públicos locales en una economía fiscalmente centralizada

In this paper we develop a probabilistic voting model of inter-governmental transfers to explain the distribution and size of local public goods. We find that: i) The parties political competition for votes induces the central government to provide regional transfers that lead to Pareto efficient lo...

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Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Kochi, Ikuho, Ponce Rodríguez, Raúl . A
Format:	Online
Language:	English
Editor:	El Colegio de México, A.C. 2011
Subjects:	competencia electoral tamaño del gobierno transferencias inter-gubernamentales H50 H41 H77 electoral competition size of government inter-governmental transfers
Online Access:	https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/102
Journal:	Estudios Económicos